ABSTRACT In this paper, we present a user-friendly MatLab-based Mean-Field-Type Games (MFTG) Toolbox that allows simulating a diversity of scalar-valued and matrix-valued MFTG problems for an arbitrary number of players, e.g., non-cooperative, fully-cooperative and co-opetitive approaches. We present details of each one of the developed tools together with the corresponding pseudo codes, and several illustrative examples. In addition, we provide the 20 functions composing the MFTG toolbox to freely download.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mean-Field-Type Games (MFTG) are a class of stochastic games considering, in the cost functional and systemstate dynamics, the distribution of both the system state and control inputs (strategies). This type of games involving distribution-dependent variables are getting special attention because they incorporate not only mean terms, but also variance terms within the optimization problem. Thus, MFTG are tightly associated with the mean-variance paradigm introduced in [4] , and therefore, MFTGs become a crucial game-theoretical tool in the field of risk-aware engineering. Different methods to solve MFTG have been extensively studied. Some of these methods are Stochastic Maximum Principle [5] - [7] , Dynamic Programming Principle [8] , Wiener Chaos Expansion [9] , and the Direct Method [10] - [15] . Depending on the selected methodology to solve the aforementioned game-theoretical problem, one might obtain a solution expressed in terms of either Ordinary or Partial Differential Equations. In this regard, there is also an increasing interest in the appropriate tool for simulating the MFTG, which is the main objective that this paper addresses.
A. CONTRIBUTION

The main contribution of this paper consists of an user friendly MatLab-based MFTG toolbox composed of several functions to solve Non-Cooperative, Fully-Cooperative and
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Hao Luo. Table 1 ), and considering an arbitrary number of decision-makers. The complete set of functions composing the proposed MatLab-based MFTG toolbox is presented in Figure 1 , which can be downloaded together with the numerical examples presented in this paper (see Section V). It is important to point out that, the solutions for the shown problems in this paper have been already discussed and presented in [1] , [2] and [3] . We have incorporated throughout this paper the statement corresponding to the main results in Mean-Field-Type Games, e.g., Non-Cooperative, Fully-Cooperative and Co-opetitive, in order to make the manuscript self-contained. Thus, the inputs and outputs of the toolbox are easy to understand and to apply. Hence, we briefly present the problem statement and its semi-explicit solution. Afterwards, we present the corresponding proposed MatLabbased function describing its inputs and outputs. To the best of our knowledge, there is not available user-friendly toolbox to solve the main Mean-Field-Type Game problems neither in the scalar-valued nor the matrix-valued version. Finally, we show an example illustrating how to perform simulations with the proposed toolbox.
Co-opetitive Linear-Quadratic MFTG for both scalar and matrix values (see
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TOOLBOX
The development of toolboxes is motivated by the need to facilitate obtaining results when well-established mathematical procedures have been already studied. Toolboxes have been developed in several different fields and have considerably improved the research pace. Among all the different types of tools we can find the following: tools that allow designing or modeling in a systematic manner, e.g., the modeling of joint contact mechanics [16] , tools that facilitate the plot of results, e.g., the generation of medical images [17] , and/or tools allowing the analysis of systems' performance [18] . In particular, the toolbox that is proposed in this paper concerns to the game, learning and automatic control theory as presented next.
As previously mentioned, there are several alternatives to solve the Mean-Field-Type Game problems addressed in this manuscript obtaining different mathematical representations of the solutions with diverse complexities. For instance, some approaches allow solving the aforementioned problems in terms of partial differential equations (PDEs). In contrast, Direct Method allows solving the underlying problems in a semi-explicit way, i.e., obtaining ordinary differential equations (ODEs). Depending on the complexity of the solution and the selected method, numerical solutions are required. In [1] , the fact that the Direct Method can be used to improve numerical methods in mean-field-type game theory has been discussed. In this regard, the toolbox presented in this paper significantly contributes to enhance the numerical methods.
C. STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the three main functions that compose each one of the MFTG approaches, i.e., problem setup, generation of solution and presentation of results. Section III presents the scalar-valued MFTG for non-cooperative, fully-cooperative and co-opetitive scenarios, including numerical examples. Then, Section IV presents the matrix-valued MFTG for both non-cooperative and fully-cooperative scenarios, including numerical examples. Section V shows how to freely obtain the proposed MatLab-based MFTG Toolbox. Finally, concluding remarks are drawn in Section VI.
II. STRUCTURE OF THE FUNCTIONS
The MatLab-based MFTG toolbox is classified depending on the type of MFTG problem as shown in Table 1 . Each classification is composed by three main functions as presented in Figure 2 , i.e., a problem setup, generation of solution, and finally a presentation of results. These three functions are described next together with some examples. We also present a general flow chart/workflow in Figure 3 , of the proposed toolbox as it has been presented for other MatLabbased tools, e.g., [16] , [17] . Moreover, we also provide some specific and short MatLab scripts in order to illustrate how user-friendly the toolbox is as in [19] , and present some respective pseudocodes.
A. PROBLEM SETUP
For each one of the scenarios, there is a function under the name Problem_setup_..._MFTG.m where the user should provide information about the MFTG problem, e.g., the number of players, the parameters corresponding to the system dynamics, and the cost functions; and also information for simulation purposes, i.e., the time steps along the time horizon and a guess about the initial conditions for the ordinary differential equations. All these parameters depend on the specific MFTG problem, and details can be found in each one of the examples presented at each section throughout this paper. The Problem_setup_..._MFTG.m function creates a structure containing all these parameters under the name Input_Data.
B. GENERATION OF SOLUTION
This function is the core of the MFTG Toolbox. There is a function in charge of computing the solution for each one of the MFTG problems. This main functions receive the structure Input_Data from the function Problem_setup_..._MFTG.m, and returns a structure under the name Output_Data incorporating the evolution of the system states and its expectation, the evolution of the optimal control inputs for each one of the players and its expectation, the evolution of the Riccati equations, and the optimal costs for all the players.
C. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
Finally, the last main function of the MFTG Toolbox corresponds to Figures_MFTG_....p. Such function is in charge of the presentation of results, i.e., it receives the structure Output_Data from the core function that solves the MFTG problem, and returns several organized plots with the corresponding labels. These results can be seen throughout the paper, e.g., Figures 5-15.
III. SCALAR MEAN-FIELD-TYPE GAMES
We start discussing the scalar-valued MFTG problems for three different scenarios, i.e., non-cooperative, fullycooperative, and co-opetitive approaches. Figure 4 presents Algorithm 1, which is the general pseudocode corresponding to the setting of parameters for both the scalar-valued noncooperative and fully-cooperative scenarios. In this section we present 12 functions of the proposed MFTG Toolbox. 
A. NON-COOPERATIVE APPROACH
The Non-Cooperative Linear-Quadratic MFTG Problem is given by 
1) SEMI-EXPLICIT SOLUTION
The solution for the one-dimentional Non-Cooperative MFTG is stated in Proposition 1 next.
Proposition 1 (Result Presented in [1]):
The feedbackstrategies linear-quadratic mean-field-type Nash equilibrium for the Non-Cooperative Problem, and the optimal costs are given by:
for all i ∈ N , where α i , β i , γ i , and δ i solve the following differential equations:
where α i (T ) = q i , β i (T ) = q i +q i , and γ i = δ i = 0.
2) MatLab-BASED MFTG TOOLBOX EXAMPLE
We present a three-player example corresponding to the scalar-valued non-cooperative MFTG problem. Notice that, the MatLab script, corresponding to the example, follows the pseudocode presented in Figure 4 . Next, we present the MatLab script corresponding to the problem setup VOLUME 7, 2019 from the function under the name Problem_setup_ noncooperative_MFTG.m.
Once the parameters corresponding to the game problem have been established, then the complete code for the simulation by using the proposed MatLab-based toolbox from the function MAIN_non_cooperative_MFTG.m is as follows:
The main function noncooperative_MFTG.p returns the solution of the non-cooperative MFTG problem providing the data presented in Table 2 . The function Figures_MFTG_ScNonCoop.p generates the plots in Figure 5 , where it can be seen, for example that, the system state is driven to zero and that the boundary conditions are met for the Riccati equations. On the other hand, Figure 6 shows the optimal costs corresponding to the three players. 
B. COOPERATIVE APPROACH
On the other hand, there is a scenario in which all the players cooperate to each other in order to pursue a common objective. The Cooperative Linear-Quadratic MFTG Problem is given by
where q 0 = i∈N q i , q 0 +q 0 = i∈N (q i +q i ) ∈ R ≥0 , r i , r i +r i ∈ R >0 , and b 0 , b 1 ,b 1 , b 2j ,b 2j , σ 0 ∈ R, for all j ∈ N . Moreover, B denotes a standard Brownian motion; and E[x] and E[u j ] denote the expected value of the system state and the j th control input, respectively.
1) SEMI-EXPLICIT SOLUTION
Proposition 2 below presents the solution for the one-dimentional Cooperative MFTG problem.
Proposition 2 (Result Presented in [1]):
The feedbackstrategies linear-quadratic mean-field-type Nash equilibrium for the Cooperative Problem, and the optimal costs are given by:
for all i ∈ N , where α 0 , β 0 , γ 0 , and δ 0 solve the following differential equations:
where α 0 (T ) = q 0 , β 0 (T ) = q 0 +q 0 , and γ 0 = δ 0 = 0.
2) MatLab-BASED MFTG TOOLBOX EXAMPLE
We present a three-player example corresponding to the scalar-valued cooperative MFTG problem. Next, we present the MatLab script corresponding to the problem setup from the function under the name Problem_setup_ cooperative_MFTG.m. This illustrative example MatLab script follows the same procedure established in the pseudocode in Figure 4 . Now, we present the main MatLab script to solve the scalarvalued fully-cooperative MFTG problem from the function MAIN_cooperative_MFTG.m evoking the main function cooperative_MFTG.p, which returns the data presented in Table 3 .
Finally, the function Figures_MFTG_ScCoop.p generates the Figures 7 and 8 where the complete solution of the game can be seen. Note that the boundary conditions for the Riccati equations are satisfied.
C. CO-OPETITIVE APPROACH
Consider that the decision-makers can interact to each other by either cooperating or competing. In this regard, there is a co-opetitive interaction in the game since decision-makers can behave by partial/full selfishness, or partial/full altruism. Such behavior is determined throughout some co-opetitive parameters given by for all i ∈ N , which determine the level of selfishness and altruism with other decision makers. The term λ ij indicates the co-opetition of decision-maker i ∈ N with the decisionmaker j ∈ N , i.e., • Partial altruism towards j: if λ ij > 0 the i th decision maker is considering positively j s playoff in this own behavior.
• Partial non-cooperation towards j : If λ ij = 0 the i th decision maker is not considering j s playoff in this own behavior.
• Partial Spite towards j: if λ ij < 0 the i th decision maker is considering negatively j s playoff in this own behavior. The Co-opetitive Linear-Quadratic MFTG Problem is introduced next.
where q i , q i +q i ∈ R ≥0 , r i , r i +r i ∈ R >0 , and 
1) SEMI-EXPLICIT SOLUTION
Proposition 3 below presents the solution for the scalarvalued co-opetitive MFTG problem.
Proposition 3 (Result Presented in [2]):
The feedbackstrategies linear-quadratic mean-field-type Nash equilibrium for the co-opetitive Problem, and the optimal costs are given by:
, where α i , β i , γ i , and δ i solve the following differential equations: 
where
, and
2) MatLab-BASED MFTG TOOLBOX EXAMPLE Figure 9 presents Algorithm 2, corresponding to the pseudocode for the setting of parameters for the co-opetitive scenario. Following the previously mentioned pseudocode, we present a five-player example corresponding to the scalar-valued co-opetitive MFTG problem. Next, we present the MatLab script corresponding to the problem setup from the function under the name Problem_setup_ coopetitive_MFTG.m. Notice that the setup for this game scenario requires an extra input corresponding to the co-opetitive parameters λ ∈ R n×n . We present the function MAIN_coopetitive_MFTG.m for the scalar-valued co-opetitive MFTG problem, which evokes the function coopetitive_MFTG.p that is in charge of solving the game and that returns the data presented in Table 4 .
Finally, the function Figures_MFTG_ScCo_Op.p generates the Figures 10 and 11 , where it can be observed that the trajectories fulfill the respective boundary conditions.
IV. MATRIX-VALUED MEAN-FIELD-TYPE GAMES
Now, system dynamics that represent the evolution of a matrix-valued state are considered, and considering that the players' choices are also given by matrix-valued control inputs. Figure 12 presents the Algorithm 3, that is the general pseudocode corresponding to the setting of parameters for both the matrix-valued non-cooperative and matrix-valued fully-cooperative scenarios. Here, we present eight functions of the MFTG Toolbox. 
A. NON-COOPERATIVE APPROACH
Let us consider the following matrix-valued non-cooperative MFTG problem: 
1) SEMI-EXPLICIT SOLUTION
Proposition 4 below presents the semi-explicit solution corresponding the matrix-valued approach in a non-cooperative scenario.
Proposition 4 (Result Presented in [3] ): Assume that Q i , R i , Q i +Q i , R i +R i are symmetric positive definite. Then the matrix-valued mean-field-type (risk-neutral) Nash equilibrium strategy and the (risk-neutral) equilibrium cost are given by: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where P i ,P i , and δ i solve the following differential equations: 
, and δ i (T ) = 0, whenever these differential equations have a unique solution that does not blow up within [0, T ].
2) MatLab-BASED MFTG TOOLBOX EXAMPLE
The following MatLab script corresponds to a twoplayer matrix-valued non-cooperative MFTG example from the function Problem_setup_noncoopetitive_ Matrix _MFTG.m, and its procedure corresponds with the pseudocode presented in Figure 12 : Therefore, next MatLab script corresponds to the simulation for the matrix-valued non-cooperative MFTG problem using MAIN_non_cooperative_Matrix_MFTG.m. The core function noncooperative_Matrix_MFTG.p is evoked, which returns the solution as presented in Table 5 .
Once the MFTG problem is solved, the function Figures_MFTG_MaNonCoop.p generates the Figure 13 , where it can be verified the satisfaction of the boundary conditions of the Riccati equations.
B. COOPERATIVE APPROACH
Finally, we consider the matrix-valued cooperative MFTG problem, i.e.,
where Q 0 = i∈N Q i , R i ,Q 0 = i∈NQ i ,R i are positive with values in R d×d . [3] ): Assume that 
1) SEMI-EXPLICIT SOLUTION
Proposition 5 (Result Presented in
where P 0 ,P 0 , and δ 0 solve the following differential equations:
with boundary conditions P 0 (T ) = Q 0 (T ),P 0 (T ) = Q 0 (T ) + Q 0 (T ), and δ 0 (T ) = 0. Notice that these Riccati equations have positive solution P 0 ,P 0 , and δ 0 and there is no blow up in [0, T ].
2) MatLab-BASED MFTG TOOLBOX EXAMPLE
The following MatLab script is developed based on the procedure shown in the pseudocode in Figure 12 . The illustrative example corresponds to a two-player matrixvalued cooperative MFTG example from the function MAIN_cooperative_Matrix_MFTG.m: Therefore, by using the structure Input_Data provided by the problem setup, the game is solved by means of the function cooperative_Matrix_MFTG.p, which returns a structure Output_Data as presented in Table 6 .
Finally, the function Figures_MFTG_MaCoop.p presents the results in Figures 14 and 15 showing the optimal trajectories for the system states, control inputs, and Riccati equations; and the optimal costs, respectively. 
V. HOW TO GET THE MFTG TOOLBOX?
The codes and functions composing the MatLab-based MFTG Toolbox (see Figure 1) can be downloaded from the website of the research group Learning & Game Theory Laboratory, or from the personal websites of the authors. By the time this paper has been submitted, the MatLab-based MFTG Toolbox is available at the following links:
• https://wp.nyu.edu/landg/ • https://wp.nyu.edu/jbarreirogomez/
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a user-friendly MatLab-based toolbox in order to solve in a semi-explicit manner different MFTG problems involving an arbitrary number of players, e.g., noncooperative, fully-cooperative and co-opetitive approaches. We have also addressed both scalar-valued and matrix-valued games. As further work, we plan to continuously add more functions to the toolbox, e.g., incorporating regime switching and jumps. VOLUME 7, 2019 
